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8: Displacing Orientalism: Ottoman
Jihad, German Imperialism,
and the Armenian Genocide
Rachel MagShamhráin
THIS CHAPTER EXAMINES VARIOUS DISCOURSES involved in German-Turkish relations from the 1890s until the end of the First World War, argu-
ing that they are evidence of a more multidirectional Orientalism than is 
suggested by Edward Said’s idea of a hegemonic West representing and 
therefore controlling an essentialized East.1 Orientalism, these discourses 
reveal, does not occur along the single trajectory suggested by its name. 
It is not simply a nonreversible, monodirectional phenomenon radiating 
out from the West onto a passive Eastern object, but rather, as Sheldon 
Pollock among others has argued, something that can also emanate from 
the East, be applied by the East to itself, and even be applied by the West 
to the West.2 In short, the dialectics of Orientalism are infinitely more con-
flicted, complex, decentered, and displaced than Said’s approach indicates.
The image of the “sick old man of Europe” as a passive Eastern pawn 
in Western imperialist power games is a case in point, failing to do justice 
to the extent to which the Ottoman Empire was an active participant in 
the major power plays of the period, all the while serving its own political 
agendas, which included a hegemonic national project based on ideas of 
“ethnic-national homogeneity,” or, as John Morrow puts it, “historians 
have long credited the German government with manipulating the Otto-
man government into the war to foster German aims of an empire from 
Berlin to Baghdad. . . . More recently [however, they] have recognized 
that the . . . Young Turks had their own aims, and . . . manipulated the 
Germans.”3 Only a paradigm that departs quite radically from Saidean 
Orientalism4 can adequately account for the intricacies of the relation-
ship between Wihelmine Germany and Turkey, which cut across tradi-
tional East-West cultural cleavages in the service of political and economic 
interests on both sides, and which required at times that even the most 
dominant cultural tropes determining difference and affinity be treated in 
an intriguingly casual fashion. This meant, for instance, that while a tradi-
tional and uncritical association of the Orient with Islam still doubtlessly 
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prevailed at the time (an association with which, incidentally, even post-
Saidean scholarship is still struggling),5 religious divides that served the 
purposes of Othering the Orient were convolutedly downplayed.
Jennifer Jenkins has recently argued for more attention to be paid to 
“the centrality of the Ottoman Empire, and its border with Europe, [and] 
to the various forms taken by German Orientalism,” and sees the need 
for a timely “reminder of the profound and long-standing relationship 
between Germany and the Ottoman Empire — wiping away the historical 
amnesia that surrounds this topic, at least on the German side,” espe-
cially in the context of Turkey’s wish to accede to the EU and the oppo-
sition this has encountered in various quarters.6 The historical amnesia, 
which has allowed Angela Merkel, for instance, to argue that the potential 
accession of Turkey to the EU would be a “Katastrophe für die politische 
Union Europas,”7 primarily on the basis of Turkey’s human-rights record, 
has been facilitated to a certain extent by Said’s exemption of Germany 
from the worst excesses of European Orientalism in his landmark work 
of 1978. In the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, he writes, Ger-
many had no “protracted sustained national interest in the Orient,” and 
thus did not engage in Orientalism in the same sense that France and 
Britain did. Said therefore considers the German Orient to be “almost 
exclusively a scholarly, or at least a classical, Orient: it was made the sub-
ject of lyrics, fantasies, and even novels, but it was never actual, the way 
Egypt and Syria were actual for Chateaubriand, Lane, Lamartine, Burton, 
Disraeli, or Nerval.”8
While Said’s argument largely holds true for most of the nineteenth 
century, by the reign of Wilhelm II Germany’s interest in the Orient was 
by no means purely scholarly, and the attitude to the Orient, encapsu-
lated in Bismarck’s famous 1878 statement that the Balkans were not 
worth “die Knochen eines einzigen pommerschen Grenadiers,” simply 
no longer pertained.9 In fact, what remained of the Ottoman Empire 
would soon become what was effectively “a Turkish client state beholden 
to [Germany] financially, technically . . . , and militarily.”10 In a sense, 
it was a colony in all but name, and Germany’s political and economic 
activity nothing less than an actio in distans colonialism. In the words of 
the Protestant theologian Friedrich Naumann, founder of the Christian 
socialist Nationalsozialer Verein party and part of Wilhelm II’s entourage 
on his second Orient trip of 1898, the plan for Turkey was “das Land 
wirtschaftlich von uns abhängig machen, um es später politisch kontrol-
lieren zu können.”11
One slightly bizarre manifestation of Germany’s increasingly “actual” 
interest in the Orient was Kaiser Wilhelm’s declaration during that self-
same trip of an everlasting friendship between the German emperor and 
“His Majesty the Sultan and the three hundred millions of Moslems 
who, in whatever corner of the globe they may live, revere in him their 
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Khalif.”12 In this speech, given as he stood at the tomb of Saladin in 
Damascus, he also took the opportunity to chastise Protestantism for its 
comparative lack of unity and appealed to his German subjects to strive 
to impress Muslims by their acts of charity, thereby awakening in them a 
respect for and love of Christianity. Although the German foreign minis-
try encouraged the belief that the Kaiser was merely visiting the region to 
make a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, he was actually actively cultivating 
an alliance between Germany and the Ottoman Empire, for, as he put it 
to “dear cousin Nikki” in August 1897, “the Mahometans [would be] a 
tremendous card in our game in case you or I were suddenly confronted 
by a war with the certain meddlesome Power,” that power being none 
other, of course, than Britain.13
A second, perhaps equally peculiar, manifestation of Germany’s grow-
ing imperialist intentions toward the Orient was the Ottoman Empire’s 
declaration of jihad on the Entente powers in November 1914. A note 
written by the Kaiser in late July of that year makes it quite clear that this 
idea of an anti-British jihad was German rather than Turkish in origin: 
“Unsere Consuln in Türkei und Indien, Agenten etc. müssen die ganze 
Mohamedanische Welt gegen dieses verhaßte, verlogene, gewissenlose 
Krämervolk [i.e. the English] zum wilden Aufstand entflammen; denn 
wenn wir uns verbluten sollen, dann soll England wenigstens Indien ver-
lieren.”14 Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, in the proclamation of jihad by 
the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the enemies identified are not infidels in general, as 
one might expect, but rather, coincidentally, the enemies of Germany:
Oh, Moslems! Ye who are smitten with happiness and are on the 
verge of sacrificing your life and your good for the cause of right, 
and of braving perils, gather now around the Imperial throne, obey 
the commands of the Almighty, who, in the Koran, promises us bliss 
in this and in the next world; embrace ye the foot of the Caliph’s 
throne and know ye that the state is at war with Russia, England, 
France, and their Allies, and that these are the enemies of Islam. The 
Chief of the believers, the Caliph, invites you all as Moslems to join 
in the Holy War.15
Despite the call to arms, Henry Morgenthau, the American ambassa-
dor to the Ottoman Empire at the time, noted, albeit with the benefit of 
hindsight and in the patronizing manner of his day and culture, that the 
entire project was doomed to failure from the start because “the Moham-
medans of such countries as India, Egypt, Algiers, and Morocco knew 
that they were getting far better treatment than they could obtain under 
any other conceivable conditions” (AMS, 116). And so Morgenthau (evi-
dently oblivious to the irony inherent in his position) saw the declaration 
of Holy War as little more than “evidence of the fundamental German 
clumsiness and real ignorance of racial psychology” (AMS, 116).
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The New York Times of 7 July 1918 agreed with Morgenthau’s assess-
ment, reiterating his remark that a jihad of this kind was impossible, for 
one thing because “simple minded Mohammedans could not understand 
why they should prosecute a holy war against Christians with Christian 
nations, such as Germany and Austria, as their partners.”16 However, the 
idea that “230,000,00017 Mohammedans [might] have risen as one man 
and precipitated upon the world the most horrible riot of destruction 
and massacre that the world has ever recorded” was not initially consid-
ered to be quite so unlikely a prospect, if only because the bizarre alliance 
between Turkey and Germany made such strange things seem perfectly 
possible. And so “the world for a brief period stood aghast at the possibil-
ity of what might occur [if] the Mohammedans met the expectations of 
the Kaiser and the Caliph and responded as they should have responded 
according to the tenets of their faith.”18
Notoriously anti-British, Kaiser Wilhelm II had long entertained the 
idea that the British Empire might be undermined by manipulating the 
forces of burgeoning pan-Islamism, seemingly unaware that the concerns 
of pan-Islamism might not precisely coincide with those of Germany. For 
although the Kaiserreich had initially been alarmed by the rapid spread of 
Islam in the late nineteenth century, particularly in Africa, where it had 
colonies, the diplomat, archeologist, and Orientalist Max von Oppenheim 
managed to foster the belief that Islam, which he claimed was by its very 
nature militant, could readily be harnessed as an effective weapon by the 
Germans and directed against Britain.
As Kris Manjapra has pointed out, by 1908 “Germany had the second-
largest shipping traffic with India, after Great Britain,”19 giving rise to an 
intense trade rivalry between the two nations with regard to the subconti-
nent, not to mention other British overseas possessions. The importance of 
the Indian Empire to Germany’s economy played a part in the development 
of Oppenheim’s bafflingly simplistic plan to turn Islam against the British. 
There were 94 million Muslims in the British Empire,20 more than half of 
whom lived in India,21 and if they could be made to rise up en masse at the 
declaration of jihad and crush the infidel British (while sparing the infidel 
Germans), this would render Britain less of a competitor in the struggle for 
imperialist influence. The rhetorical arsenal for this project was readily pro-
vided by the ethnological discourses of the period, which tended to ascribe 
mentalities and motives to entire peoples.22 In the specific case of Islam, 
since the Crusade of 1096 when the worlds of Christianity and Islam first 
came into contact in a significant sense, Muslims had been associated in the 
European imagination with war and the warrior spirit, as in the chansons 
de geste, where the Saracens were depicted as “worthy of respect, a good 
enemy, [and] difficult to conquer.”23 And this was a view that Oppenheim 
certainly shared, characterizing the Muslims, whom he hoped to incite to 
insurrection, as, among other things, bellicose by nature.24
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Despite a “zwanzigjährige[r] Aufenthalt im Orient,”25 Oppenheim 
had, somewhat bafflingly, failed to recognize, however, that it was in the 
main Indian Hindus, not Muslims, who were inclined to engage in sub-
versive activity against the British Empire. Moreover, he failed to consider 
that the declaration of Holy War by an Ottoman Sheikh-ul-Islam might 
not speak to Muslims worldwide, many of whom simply did not recog-
nize his authority and right to declare jihad in the first place.
Oppenheim’s ignorance is all the more baffling when contrasted with 
the insights of his contemporary, the famous Dutch Orientalist Christiaan 
Snouck Hurgronje, whose intimate knowledge of Islam had helped the 
Dutch defeat the native Indonesians in the so-called Aceh War. As Hur-
gronje pointed out in a publication of 1915, the fragmentation of the 
Muslim population over different states posed a major, if not insurmount-
able, impediment to a Holy War of the kind Germany hoped to unleash: 
“The jihad-program assumes that the Mohammedans, just as at their first 
appearance in the world, continuously form a compact unity under one 
man’s leadership.” But this, he notes, had long since ceased to be the 
case, and “by this disintegration the continuance of the world conquest, 
as it was started in the first century of Islam, is made impossible.”26 He 
also noted that the tendency to view the Caliphate as a kind of Muslim 
papacy was misguided and a dangerous European projection onto the East 
that doomed projects such as Oppenheim’s to failure: “Certain European 
writers sometimes have felt induced to represent [the Caliphate] as a kind 
of religious princes [sic] of Islâm, who voluntarily or not had transferred 
their secular power to the many territorial princes in the wide dominion 
of Islâm . . . a sort of Mohammedan papacy. . . . ]Here, as elsewhere, the 
multitude preferred legend to fact.”27
Despite the fact that Oppenheim’s assumptions were so fundamen-
tally flawed and at variance with the insights of such established Islamists 
as Hurgronje, the British in India took the precaution of getting the 
Nizam of Hyderabad to declare that, although the Sultan of Turkey was 
nominally head of Islam worldwide, the First World War was a political 
rather than a religious conflict, and therefore the call to Holy War was 
invalid and would be ignored by him.28
While Oppenheim’s essentializing notions about Islam are pure 
Orientalism in the sense that Said meant it (a hegemonic discursive 
act performed by the West on the East, albeit, in this case, with Great 
Britain as the indirect target), at the time of the so-called “unholy” 
German-Turkish alliance29 the Turks were themselves engaging in Ori-
entalism of another kind — an “eastern Orientalism,” to borrow Shel-
don Pollock’s term (DO, 96). Pollock uses the expression to indicate 
that “the movement of Orientalist knowledge may be multidirectional. 
We usually imagine its vector as directed outward — toward the colo-
nization and domination of Asia; . . . we might [however] conceive of 
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it as potentially directed inward — toward the colonization and domi-
nation of Europe itself” (DO, 76–77). In this analysis the expression 
will be used to indicate that while the Ottoman Empire was no doubt 
the object and victim of Western Orientalist discourses and policies, it 
also both encouraged the Western gaze and cultural projections for its 
own purposes (Turkey was, for example, the passive instigator of the 
Turko-German alliance of 2 August 1914)30 and, all importantly, was 
engaged in inwardly directed hegemonic discourses of its own, of which 
more later. This Eastern Orientalism, or Orientalism in, of, and for the 
East, is not to be confused with the interpellation of the colonized by 
the colonizer. In other words, although Turkey was certainly to some 
extent what Kiossev calls a “self-colonizing culture,”31 that is to say 
one that, due to a sense of lack or inadequacy, “willingly” imports and 
adopts outside values, its participation in hegemonic discourses cannot 
be reduced to the simple internalization of Western ideas. If Orientalism 
is simply “a discourse of power that divides the world into ‘betters and 
lessers’ [facilitating] the domination (or ‘orientalization’ or ‘coloniza-
tion’) of any group” (DO, 77), indigenous discourses of power in the 
Ottoman Empire of the period were themselves independently Oriental-
ist. If we fail to recognize this, we find ourselves automatically engag-
ing in the crass form of essentializing Orientalism found in the New 
York Times article above, reducing German involvement in the Near 
East in the late eighteen and early nineteen hundreds to a West-to-East 
Orientalism, whereby dastardly Germans used their financial clout and 
rhetorical cunning to bamboozle poor “simpleminded” Ottomans into 
doing their bidding, including declaring Holy War on the enemies of 
the Vaterland.
In other words, Turkish-German relations of the period cannot for 
a variety of reasons simply be regarded as what Homi K. Bhabha saw as 
a necessarily symbiotic relationship or interdependency between Euro-
pean colonial conqueror and Oriental conquered.32 When talking about 
the relationship between Orient and Occident in the case of Wilhelmine 
Germany and the Ottoman Empire, it is essential to recognize that there 
are also “Orientalist discourses within nation-states [both East and West] 
that operate internally and objectify, stigmatize and essentialize a particu-
lar geography, ethnicity and culture.”33 To call the discursive battlefield 
“Orientalism” at all, then, is in a way misleading, because focusing on 
the East-West divide elides the Orientalism that occurs in all cultures vis-
à-vis both other cultures and elements within themselves. A good case in 
point would be the “dhimmitude” of Shari’a states,34 or, relatedly, the 
Tehcir Law of the Ottoman Empire and the ensuing Armenian genocide 
in which perhaps as many as 1.8 million Armenians were killed in a brutal 
and systematic campaign of eradication. However, Orientalism, mislead-
ing or not, is such a fixed category of modern critical thought that any 
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discussion of Turkish-German relations cannot just ignore it. But if it can-
not be dismissed it must be revalorized so that Eastern acts of “Oriental-
ism” such as the Armenian Aghed are not forgotten in postcolonialism’s 
blame game.
To return to German-Ottoman inter-involvement in the Wilhelmine 
period, another curious by-product of the relationship was “a tradition of 
German anti-Armenian propaganda that emerged in response to German 
foreign-policy needs after the 1880s.”35 Despite the fact that the perse-
cuted Armenians, like the Germans, were Christians (notwithstanding 
the Dvin Council), and despite the deep Christian-Islamic fault line that 
Oppenheim had hoped to exploit in a jihad, Germany took an anti-Arme-
nian stance during the Turkish suppression of what was cast as Armenian 
sedition and secessionism. For one thing, Germany needed to ingratiate 
itself with the Ottomans, upon whom it was now parasitically dependent, 
and for another, Germany was deeply concerned by pro-Russian Arme-
nian feeling and the risk of growing Russian influence in the Balkans. As 
a result of its vested interest in Anatolia, a particularly distorted and nega-
tive image of “the Armenian” developed in Germany at around this time, 
an exemplary instance of which can be found in Karl May’s 1897 travel-
ogue Auf fremden Pfaden. His description of an encounter with what he 
sees as a typical Armenian begins comparatively moderately with a depic-
tion of the man’s long, angular, haggard body and narrow forehead but 
soon gains momentum when it reaches the bloodless lips, “stark gebo-
gene, breitflügelige” hawk nose and “listige,” hooded eyes, basing argu-
ments about the (moral) character of the Armenian people as a whole on 
these caricatural physiognomic observations:
Die stark entwickelten Kauwerkzeuge und das breit vortretende 
Kinn liessen auf Egoismus, Rücksichtslosigkeit und überwiegend tie-
rische Affekte schliessen, während die obere Hälfte des Gesichts eine 
bedeutende, absichtlich verborgene Verschlagenheit verriet. Wenn 
dieser Mann nicht ein Armenier war, so gab es überhaupt keine 
Armenier! Ein Jude überlistet zehn Christen; ein Yankee betrügt 
fünfzig Juden, ein Armenier aber ist hundert Yankees gewachsen; so 
sagt man, und ich habe gefunden, dass dies zwar übertrieben ausge-
drückt ist, aber doch auf Wahrheit beruht. Man bereise den Orient 
mit offenen Augen, so wird man mir recht geben. Wo irgendeine 
Heimtücke, eine Verräterei geplant wird, da ist sicher die Habichts-
nase eines Armeniers im Spiel.36
This stereotype is eminently recognizable, of course, as an ethno-
graphic Wandertopos, applied at other historical junctures mutatis mutan-
dis to both Jesuits and Jews. We should, however, note that the image 
of the cunning Armenian was not entirely a late-nineteenth-century 
German invention, although it certainly served the country’s political 
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purposes to revive the topos at that time. It is a more widespread and 
older trope, used, for instance, in 1826 by the English travel writer and 
social reformer J. S. Buckingham in a description that, while certainly less 
negative, also ascribes a fundamental shrewdness to the Armenians, who 
“dispersed all over Asia . . . exert their natural genius for trade, princi-
pally in speculations as money-changers. . . . They are naturally formed 
for commerce — cunning among those they know, reserved with strang-
ers, temperate from economy or avarice, and humble and accommodating 
for the sake of interest.”37
It may seem extraordinary that Germany would not object in any 
meaningful way to the persecution of fellow Christians by Muslim Turks, 
especially in light of Article 61 of the Congress of Berlin of 1878, in 
which the European powers pledged to support the Ottoman Armenians. 
But a passage by the German Orientalist Paul Rohrbach, who began to 
explore and write about the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, leaves us in no doubt about Germany’s real priorities: “Der Besitzer 
Armeniens beherrscht unmittelbar sowohl das Östliche als auch das obere 
Mesopotamien. . . . Soll also die Türkei erhalten bleiben, so muss auch 
Armenien türkisch bleiben, und weil wir die Türkei stützen müssen, so 
lange eine Möglichkeit dazu besteht, kann nicht zugelassen werden, dass 
Armenien in die Hände Russlands fällt.”38
The change in foreign policy that saw Christian Germany taking the 
part of Muslim Turkey against the “cunning and treacherous” Christian 
Armenians was brought about, like so many changes of the day, by the 
railway. When the Deutsche Bank was granted a concession by the Otto-
man Caliphate in 1888 to build a railway line between the Bosporus at 
Constantinople and Angora, the first leg of a planned line all the way 
to Baghdad, Germany suddenly became aware of the potential that the 
Ottoman Empire held as an extraterritorial economic sphere of influence. 
Previously the Kaiserreich had seen the crumbling Turkish Empire only 
as a tub thrown to a whale, a means of distracting France, England, and 
Russia, thus minimizing their threat to real German interests in Central 
and Eastern Europe. But with the completion of Baron von Hirsch’s Ori-
ental Railway in 1888, Berlin was now directly linked to Istanbul by rail 
and would soon be linked to Konya in central Anatolia, and eventually 
to Baghdad, and with these rail links came economic ties. Germany real-
ized that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire would immediately result 
in its being carved up by the main European powers, whose involvement 
would inevitably obstruct Germany’s spreading influence in the region. 
Ironically, Germany needed to keep the Ottoman Empire intact for as 
long as possible since it could profit from it more in toto than in part.
Rosa Luxemburg’s so-called Junius Pamphlet of 1915 demonstrates 
just how far-reaching, and in her view damaging, German involvement 
was in the Near East on the eve of the First World War, calling Turkey 
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the “most important field of operations of German imperialism.”39 In the 
course of work on the Baghdad railway, a scheme that R. I. Money saw as 
restoring prosperity to a central Anatolia that had “degenerated” after the 
breakup of the Seljuk state,40 Lake Karaviran and the Plain of Konya were 
drained and irrigated respectively, developments that Luxemburg refuses 
to see as Western gifts to a primitive Anatolia, arguing instead that:
The reverse of this wonderful work of “peaceful culture” is the 
“peaceful” and wholesale ruin of the farming population of Asia 
Minor. The cost of this tremendous undertaking was advanced, of 
course, by the Deutsche Bank on the security of a widely diversi-
fied system of public indebtedness. Turkey will be, to all eternity, the 
debtor of Messrs. Siemens, Gwinner, Helfferich, etc. . . .
 Thus a twofold purpose is accomplished. The farming popula-
tion of Asia Minor becomes the object of a well organized process 
of exploitation in the interest of European, in this case German, 
financial and industrial capital. This again promotes the growth of 
the German sphere of interest in Turkey and lays the foundation for 
Turkey’s “political protection.” At the same time the instrument 
that carries out the exploitation of the farming population, the Turk-
ish Government, becomes the willing tool and vassal of Germany’s 
foreign policies.41
Naturally, Germans rarely stated the nature of their interest in the 
Ottoman Empire as baldly as this, so as not to alienate the Ottomans or 
draw too much English, French, and Russian attention to the “actual” 
nature of Germany’s involvement. Sanitizing, palliating discourses were 
used instead to make Germany’s intervention both less perturbing to the 
other Great Powers and more palatable to itself. And so German activity 
in the region was frequently portrayed in terms of a mission civilisatrice, 
a concept that had long since provided the French and the English with 
justification for their colonial activities, casting these foreign incursions as 
a high-minded attempt to share the benefits of European civilization with 
less fortunate parts and peoples.
One such account of German inroads into Anatolia comes from the 
editor of the Deutsche Rundschau and author of various oriental trav-
elogues, Paul Lindenberg. In an often quoted passage from his Auf 
deutschen Pfaden im Orient of 1902 he traces German participation in the 
affairs of the Near East back to the Third Crusade, when the Holy Roman 
Emperor, Barbarossa, led an army across Anatolia in an attempt to take 
back the Holy Land from Saladin, the selfsame Saladin at whose tomb 
Wilhelm II had declared his undying loyalty to “three million” Muslims. 
The passage is worth quoting in full because of the stark counterpoint 
it offers to Luxemburg’s completely unromantic portrayal of Germany’s 
real interests and their impact on the Anatolian landscape.
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Zu Ostern 1190 war es, als Kaiser Barbarossa, glaubensmutig und 
thatenfroh, an der Spitze seines erlesenen Kreuzfahrerheeres hier ent-
langzog, um nach Klein-Asien hinüberzusetzen und, dasselbe durch-
querend, gen Jerusalem vorzudringen, ohne daß er das ersehnte Ziel 
erreichen sollte!
 Jahrhundert um Jahrhundert verstrich, in Vergessenheit schie-
nen die endlosen Gebiete versunken zu sein, die einst die deut-
schen Gewappneten auf schweren Rossen durchzogen, hin und 
wieder, wenn der starke Holzpflug des türkischen Bauern die Erde 
aufwühlte, kamen die bleichen Überreste eines der heldenmütigen 
Genossen des Rotbart-Hohenstaufen zum Vorschein, oder ein ver-
wittertes steinernes Kreuz zeigte die Ruhestätte eines mannhaften 
Ritters an, der unter heißer Sonne zusammengebrochen oder den 
Feinden erlegen war. . . .
 Und eines Tages hielten die Deutschen selbst ihren Einzug in Ana-
tolien, auf denselben Pfaden, welche die Kreuzritter gezogen, aber 
nicht wie jene mit trutzigen Waffen und hoch zu Roß mit wehenden 
Bannern: Werkzeuge und Maschinen aller Art führten sie mit sich 
und in ihrem Gefolge ein Heer von emsigen Arbeitern, gegraben 
wurde und gebaut, schwindelnde Abhänge und reißende Ströme 
wurden überbrückt, Berge durchbohrt und Sümpfe ausgetrocknet, 
wo bisher auf hindernisreichen Wegen lange Kamel-Karawanen ent-
langgestapft, da dehnten sich gleißende Schienenstränge aus, auf 
welchen am Anfang der 90er Jahre pustend und schnaubend die 
ersten Lokomotiven — “Landdampfer” nannten sie die türkischen 
Bauern — einherrollten, Leben, Bewegung, Kultur in jene halbver-
gessenen Gebiete bringend, . . . die nun wieder von Jahr zu Jahr in 
wirtschaftlicher wie politischer Beziehung ganz erstaunlich an Wich-
tigkeit gewinnen.
 So kämpfen die neuen Deutschen in Klein-Asien, ihr Sieg aber 
heißt die Anatolische Eisenbahn, mit deutschem Geld von deutschen 
Ingenieuren erbaut und unter musterhafter deutscher Verwaltung 
stehend.42
Lindenberg’s text casts German involvement in the Ottoman 
Empire as a modern, more civilized version of the Crusades, suggest-
ing that, because of the Crusades, the Germans have a kind of prior 
and natural claim on the territory involved, if not exactly a god-given 
right to be there. German financial benefits are portrayed as unintended 
but welcome by-products of what is primarily a crusade to bring Asia 
Minor, the birthplace of civilization but a place that time has since for-
gotten, forward in technological, political, and economic terms.43 The 
financial-cum-cultural mission has taken over from the religious one, 
but the two are nevertheless clearly seen by Lindenberg as forming a 
logical continuum. It is also interesting that Lindenberg should cast a 
backward glance at Germany’s participation in a Christian Holy War of 
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the twelfth century, when some 800 years later Germany was master-
minding an Islamic Holy War against Christendom.
In fact, it is remarkable that Lindenberg’s in-many-ways-convention-
ally-Orientalist description of German involvement in Anatolia makes any 
mention whatsoever of the Crusades with their suggestion of inelidable 
religious differences between “East” and “West,” especially when Kaiser 
Wilhelm had been so careful to avoid the subject in Damascus, despite the 
fact that he was speaking at the tomb of the great Salah-ad-Din, nemesis 
of the Crusaders. After all, while similarities between the Crusading and 
imperialist spirits were certainly not lost on the Ottomans themselves,44 
German courtship of Turkey around 1900 required the active downplay-
ing of some longstanding if problematic ideas of Self and Other in West-
ern thought, particularly those that were by-products of what Mary Anne 
Perkins refers to as the “Christendom narrative,”45 the totalizing grand 
narrative generated by Christian culture that allowed Europeans to take 
so many liberties abroad.
This downplaying of dominant narratives in the service of foreign 
investment was by no means an easy business. The German position on 
the Armenian question, perhaps even more than Oppenheim’s strange 
idea of a German-Christian-inspired Muslim-Ottoman jihad against the 
Christian Entente states, posed particular problems, and it demonstrates 
the logical and rhetorical contortions required by Germany in this period 
to escape the clutches of the pervasive and now counterproductive Chris-
tendom narrative. Pastor Friedrich Naumann, who saw Germany’s role in 
the Near East as divinely ordained, made an admirable attempt at squar-
ing the circle, advocating that Christian Germans ignore the pogroms 
against Christian Armenian because “unser Volk auch dem Christentum 
am besten dient, wenn es sich selber im Völkerkampfe stark erhält.”46 In 
other words, as the diplomat Alfons Mumm von Schwarzenstein put it 
in 1896, it was “nicht die Aufgabe der deutschen Politik . . . sich um die 
Christen in der ganzen Welt zu kümmern und einen europäischen Kreuz-
zug gegen den Halbmond ins Leben zu rufen.”47 Even though Germany 
was endeavoring by remarkable feats of logic to negate a religious divide 
that might jeopardize its involvement in Anatolia, it is important to note 
here and elsewhere the insistent if unwelcome spectral presence of reli-
gious difference in various legitimizing discourses used by Germany to 
establish and preserve its hegemonic power in the territories of the Otto-
man Empire. While Naumann, Schwarzenstein, and Lindenberg all dis-
tance themselves from the traditional Christian-Muslim antagonism that 
inspired the Crusades, this antagonism remains something of an elephant 
in the room, recurring almost involuntarily in even the most turcophile 
discourses of the period. Religion was, after all, one of the legitimizing 
discourses underpinning European imperialism itself, and an important 
part of the colonial apparatus.48 Since it was impossible to avoid the issue 
 DISPLACING ORIENTALISM 155
Hodkinson.indd   Sec1:155 9/29/2009   6:09:51 PM
of religion altogether, therefore, Germany’s cultivation of Turkish friend-
ship required a cunning restating of religious difference and playing down 
of the colonial uses to which Christianity had been and was still being put. 
Consequently, while Christianity and its evangelizing mission are not alto-
gether ignored — they cannot be, since for centuries the world had been 
“haunted by the religious imagination of colonial Christendom”49 — they 
are made subordinate either to questions of national interest (Schwarzen-
heim and Naumann) or incorporated into the idea of German imperialism 
as a modernizing and civilizing force (Lindenberg). (It should not be for-
gotten, of course, that there was simultaneously a return of this repressed 
religious division, often in grotesque and pointed form. An 1898 political 
cartoon from the Genevan weekly Le Carillon, for instance, shows Abdul 
Hamid asking the Kaiser, “Gestattet dir dein Christus, dich für Moham-
med zu schlagen?” to which the Kaiser replies “Mein Gott ist mein Säbel!” 
On the ground at their feet lie the Bible and the Koran.50)
Turkey’s persecution and murder of its Christian Armenian popula-
tion not only elicited positively byzantine legitimizing discourses from a 
Germany that wanted to defend its involvement in and with the Otto-
man Empire. It also provides evidence of both the omnipresence and 
omnidirectionality of Orientalism. The genocide happened in two major 
waves, the first taking place in the 1890s under Sultan Abdülhamid II and 
coinciding with Germany’s Ottoman railway projects and the concomi-
tant declaration of eternal “friendship” between the Kaiserreich and the 
Sublime Porte.51 The second, more brutal, wave took place in 1915 under 
the so-called Three Pashas and coincided with the Gallipoli campaign of 
the First World War,52 likely taking place at precisely this juncture because 
the state of war lent itself both to the committing and disguising of these 
atrocities.53 In any case, there can be no doubt that the Ottoman Empire 
was convinced that it could get away with this large-scale ethnic cleans-
ing, or, as it was then portrayed, eradication of a dangerous fifth column, 
and that it was encouraged in this belief by the fact that it has an ally as 
powerful as Germany. As Baron Calice, the Austro-Hungarian Ambas-
sador to the Ottoman Empire, put it, the Sultan could feel “unter dem 
schützenden Schild Deutschlands, dem er schon soviel verdankt, mehr 
denn je frei und sicher.”54
In a perfect example of “Eastern Orientalism,” Enver Pasha, the de 
facto dictator of the Ottoman Empire from 1913, described the Arme-
nians to the concerned American ambassador in precisely the same “ori-
entalizing” way that Oppenheim had depicted “the Muslims,” namely 
as a homogenous cultural-cum-religious group that reacts en masse and 
is a potential source of separatism, fanaticism, and rebellion. (Of course, 
while Oppenheim had seen this as a good thing, to be exploited in Ger-
many’s interests, Pasha, ironically, felt that any populace with such traits 
needed to be eradicated for the good of the state.) Whether or not Enver 
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Pasha’s characterization was a matter of conviction or merely served the 
purpose of vindicating his anti-Armenian policies to the United States is 
irrelevant. The discourse engages in the same “Othering” that is at play 
when Oppenheim describes Muslims, or the “fanatische Heerscharen des 
Orients” as he calls them,55 as “kriegerisch” and “von Hass beseelt.” Like 
Oppenheim’s Muslims, Pasha’s Armenians are seen as having a religious-
cum-racial loyalty that transcends their loyalty to the state to which they 
belong, preventing them from becoming a “real part of our nation,” and 
making it likely that they would “attack us [the Ottoman Turks] in the 
back.” They are, in Pasha’s words, a people with a “revolutionary pro-
gramme” (AMS, 236), a sentiment echoed by his Minister of the Inte-
rior, Talaat Bey, who, in a wonderfully convoluted piece of logic, goes on 
to express surprise at the US ambassador’s worries about the genocide, 
saying, “You [Morgenthau] are a Jew; these people are Christians. The 
Mohammedans and the Jews always get on harmoniously. We are treating 
the Jews here all right. What have you to complain of? Why can’t you let 
us do with these Christians as we please?” (AMS, 208). Perhaps even more 
so than Pasha’s straightforward essentializing and demonizing description 
of the Armenians, the uneasy bedfellows in Talaat Bey’s statement neatly 
demonstrate Pollock’s point that Orientalism does not occur along a neat 
West-to-East axis but twists and turns and makes quantum and improb-
able leaps over and back across the seemingly most entrenched divides.
Even Ambassador Morgenthau’s classification of the Turks slightly 
later in his memoirs as “dull-witted and lazy” (AMS, 231), which Rachel 
Kirby sees as proof positive of a “proclivity toward linguistic distillation 
of ethnic types in the writings of [Western] diplomats” in the Ottoman 
Empire,56 and which thus seems to fit the Saidean paradigm perfectly, 
turns out to be more complicated. It was, in fact, an attempt by Morgen-
thau to demonstrate to Talaat Bey, in an argumentum ad absurdum, the 
insulting implications for the Turkish “national character” of Bey’s own 
argument that the Armenians’ business acumen was allowing them to 
“enrich themselves at the expense of the Turks.” This Western reiteration 
of what turns out to be a preexisting intra-oriental Orientalism reveals 
again that Saidean Orientalism is too simple a paradigm to account for any 
of the articulations, to borrow Laclau and Mouffe’s concept, involved in 
the multilateral struggle for discursive hegemony in the Ottoman Empire 
of the First World War period.
Yet another instance of a multi- rather than uni-directional “Orien-
talism” is provided by Hans Barth’s notorious anti-Armenian, pro-Turk-
ish diatribe Türke, wehre Dich! of 1898. An extremely Turcophile and 
anti-Catholic journalist, Barth played on modern German anti-religious 
sentiment in his criticism of Western efforts to garner support for the 
Armenians during the pogroms of the late nineteenth century, calling 
these efforts an eighth Crusade (meant here in an emphatically pejorative 
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sense), casting those supporting Armenia’s cause as interfering, pro-cleri-
cal, and outmodedly religious busybodies and portraying the Turks as the 
only gentlemen of the Orient. A large part of his work takes direct issue 
with the efforts of the Pietist missionary Johannes Lepsius to draw the 
German public’s attention to the plight of the Armenians, for instance 
in his bestselling Armenien und Europa: Eine Anklageschrift wider die 
christlichen Großmächte und ein Aufruf an das christliche Deutschland 
of 1896. What is interesting about Barth’s anti-Armenian, anti-Lepsian 
diatribe is that it adopts Lepsius’s arguments practically wholesale, not 
demolishing them so much as reproducing them and then inverting or 
negating them. They survive almost intact in Barth’s work in the form 
of long quotations that cannot always readily be distinguished from the 
author’s own text. Barth then merely adds a “not true” to each carefully 
preserved point, unwittingly demonstrating a strange rhetorical reversibil-
ity in this discursive field, where the selfsame arguments serve seemingly 
diametrically opposed purposes. This phenomenon of reversibility, the 
bidirectionality of which is at odds with the West-to-East discursive trajec-
tory that Said’s Orientalism implies, can be observed, for instance, when 
Barth accuses Lepsius of failing to differentiate sufficiently between Kurds 
and Turks, indiscriminately calling them both Muhammedaner.57 Barth 
promptly goes on to perform the selfsame maneuver himself, lumping 
all Armenians into the category of “Reichsfeind, . . . Revolutionär und 
Anarchisten” (40).
Another dimension of the multidirectionality of Orientalism becomes 
clear when Barth starts to juggle all the “Others” of his argument at once. 
He begins by arguing that many of the outrages committed against the 
Armenians were perpetrated not by Turks proper but by Kurds, who, while 
they are also Muslims, are only Muslim in the sense that the Armenians 
are Christians (that is, not; presumably, in the case of the latter, because 
of the schism). Moreover, he continues, the Turks themselves have had to 
suffer from Kurdish barbarity. However (he then claims, coming full cir-
cle now), the perpetrators of the recent violence (presumably both against 
Armenians and Turks) may not even be Kurdish nomads at all but rather 
radical Armenian revolutionaries in disguise:
Gewiss hatten ja die tiefer im Innern wohnenden Armenier vielfach 
unter der Willkür kurdischer Nomaden zu leiden, die das friedfertig-
gesetzliche Expropriations-Prinzip ihrer armenisch-indogermanischen 
Vettern in ihre drastischere Weise, das wucherische Rupfen ins derbe 
Plündern übersetzten — aber teilten sie dies Schicksal nicht mit der 
festansässigen türkischen Bevölkerung? Auch der Türke hatte sich ja 
von jeher mit den Nachkommen der raublustigen alten “Gordyäer” 
herumzuschlagen, deren “Islam” (viele von ihnen sind überhaupt 
Christen) kaum mehr wert ist als das “Christentum” der Arme-
nier. . . . Angesichts des grundverschiedenen Charakters von Osmanli 
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und Kurden ist darum auch hundert gegen eins zu wetten, dass — wo 
wirklich Grausamkeiten vorkamen — sie das Werk kurdischer Noma-
den oder . . . armenischer Revolutionäre waren. (36–37)
Because it has to negotiate a path for its new prejudices through such 
a dense and rooted jungle of old ones, the philoturkic, anti-Armenian 
German Orientalism of this period requires a convoluted logic that can 
make an Armenian of a Kurd, if need be. Accordingly, our German author 
defends the Muslim Ottoman Turks to his primarily Western audience by 
first “Othering” or orientalizing the Muslim Ottoman Kurds, using this 
orientalizing device as a stepping stone to the Othering or foreignizing of 
Christian Armenians, whose very Christianity is used to defamiliarize and 
exoticize them. And while Barth cannot ever fully collapse the religious 
distinction between Christian Europeans and Muslim Turks, he can claim 
that Christianity is irrelevant in modern-day, progressive Europe, adding 
for good measure that Armenian Christianity is not Christianity proper 
anyhow. Similarly, while he cannot deny that Armenian property has been 
stolen by the “wrong kind” of Muslim (that is, Kurds not Turks), he de-
exoticizes the crimes and the perpetrators by implying that these acts were 
merely a more open, honest, Islamic version of Armenians’ pernicious, if 
peaceful and lawful, “theft” of (presumably Turkish) property by means 
of the financial cunning innate to that people.
In short, Barth’s discourse involves three degrees and directions of 
orientalization or defamiliarization. He orientalizes the Kurds, using this 
exoticism (their nomadic, barbaric “Islam”) to set them apart from civi-
lized Muslims, here the Turks, who, by contrast, are automatically famil-
iarized. He then orientalizes or “Others” the Armenians by distinguishing 
their Christianity (a potentially familiarizing element) from that of Chris-
tian Europe and by implying that the un-Turkish excesses of the barbaric 
Kurds were in fact the deeds of sly Armenians in disguise. Finally, he exot-
icizes Lepsius, and other pro-Armenian German or European Christians, 
casting their philo-Armenian attitude as “unchristliche Wut” (21).
What this demonstrates, aside from the labyrinthine rhetorical tac-
tics required by the German-Turkish alliance in the period of the Arme-
nian massacre, is that Orientalism, in other words the discourses used to 
legitimize hegemonic behavior, is far more convoluted than suggested 
by Said’s idea of “[Western] knowledge and power creating ‘the Orien-
tal.’”58 Contrary to its name, the mechanism called Orientalism is at work 
in any strategic projections of difference or familiarity as a means to spe-
cific ends. It is a discursive missile that can be directed as easily at and by a 
German and a Christian as at and by a Turk and a Muslim.
As scholars such as David Kopf, Bernard Lewis, and Richard G. Fox 
have suggested,59 the West-to-East Orientalism identified by Said is prob-
lematic for several reasons. Most critically, perhaps, it fails to recognize 
 DISPLACING ORIENTALISM 159
Hodkinson.indd   Sec1:159 9/29/2009   6:09:52 PM
its own orientalizing moment (and concomitant shortcomings as a meta-
discourse). It also fails sufficiently to take into account the fact that not 
all European discourse about the Orient involves essentializing Western 
projections onto the East in the service of hegemony, and that Oriental-
ism (inasmuch as the concept has any value) has at times had a preserva-
tive function, for instance when it qua discipline has preserved aspects of 
another culture for that culture. And, as Pollock noted, a further blind-
spot of Said’s Orientalism is that it fails to recognize that the West-East 
cultural axis has no monopoly on exoticizing and marginalizing discourses 
and, if the term Orientalism is to have any currency, it has to be forced to 
take account of and “include discursively similar phenomena” (DO, 77). 
So, while not denying the reality of colonialist Orientalism, we must rec-
ognize the same processes of Othering at work in say National Socialism, 
the Indian caste system, or the Armenian genocide.
Aspects of the Ottoman-German relationship at the turn of the nine-
teenth century highlight the inadequacy of the category of Orientalism in 
its early Saidean form, which still insists on an innate difference between 
Orient and Occident albeit while critiquing it, and ascribes to Oriental-
ism a strict West-to-East trajectory. To transpose Michael Davidson’s 
idea slightly, a more appropriate way of representing the complex ways 
in which hegemony works would seem to be “not . . . the usual East-
West trajectory, but tendrils sent out from multiple sites.”60 And, if first-
degree (original pre-Saidean) Orientalism results in a “partial view of 
Islam”61 in every sense, and the second-degree (corrective) Orientalism 
of Said merely replicates the same problems albeit at a critical remove and 
couched in postcolonial terminology, this third-degree rhizomic recasting 
of Orientalism hopes that recognizing the Othering or foreignizing role 
of the concepts of Orient, Occident, Christianity, and Islam in discursive 
practices of both East and West will allow a fuller picture to emerge.
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